us-eli-mcp@0.5.3
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for US law: bills (Congress.gov), US Code (GovInfo), Federal Register, case law (CourtListener), eCFR - with verifiable citations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
US_ELI_API_KEYUS_ELI_GOVINFO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: US_ELI_AUDIT_DIR, US_ELI_BASE_URL, US_ELI_CACHE_DIR, US_ELI_COURTLISTENER_BASE_URL, US_ELI_ECFR_BASE_URL, US_ELI_FR_BASE_URL, US_ELI_GOVINFO_BASE_URL, US_ELI_RUNTIME_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso congress.gov, govinfo.gov, federalregister.gov, courtlistener.com, ecfr.gov — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names congress.gov, govinfo.gov, federalregister.gov, courtlistener.com, ecfr.gov as well as its own vendor. The guard injects US_ELI_API_KEY, US_ELI_GOVINFO_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
audit.log(tool="us_list_code_packages", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=0,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.audit.log(tool="us_get_bill", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=0,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.audit.log(tool="us_search_bills", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=len(items),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.audit.log(tool="us_search_bills", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=0,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.audit.log(tool="us_get_bill", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=1,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.sudo mv mcp-publisher /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for us-eli-mcp@0.5.3 as of 8 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.