Skills/PyPI/us-eli-mcp

us-eli-mcp@0.5.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for US law: bills (Congress.gov), US Code (GovInfo), Federal Register, case law (CourtListener), eCFR - with verifiable citations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher matematicsolutions · publishing for 149 daysInstalls 196Last detonated 38 min ago
$claude mcp add us-eli-mcp -- uvx us-eli-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
US_ELI_API_KEYUS_ELI_GOVINFO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: US_ELI_AUDIT_DIR, US_ELI_BASE_URL, US_ELI_CACHE_DIR, US_ELI_COURTLISTENER_BASE_URL, US_ELI_ECFR_BASE_URL, US_ELI_FR_BASE_URL, US_ELI_GOVINFO_BASE_URL, US_ELI_RUNTIME_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso congress.gov, govinfo.gov, federalregister.gov, courtlistener.com, ecfr.gov — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names congress.gov, govinfo.gov, federalregister.gov, courtlistener.com, ecfr.gov as well as its own vendor. The guard injects US_ELI_API_KEY, US_ELI_GOVINFO_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx us-eli-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/us_eli_mcp/server.py:371 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesaudit.log(tool="us_list_code_packages", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=0,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/us_eli_mcp/server.py:322 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesaudit.log(tool="us_get_bill", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=0,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/us_eli_mcp/server.py:285 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesaudit.log(tool="us_search_bills", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=len(items),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/us_eli_mcp/server.py:279 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesaudit.log(tool="us_search_bills", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=0,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/us_eli_mcp/server.py:330 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesaudit.log(tool="us_get_bill", input_hash=input_hash, output_count_or_size=1,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:88 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mv mcp-publisher /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 37 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for us-eli-mcp@0.5.3 as of 8 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.