unix-pass-mcp@0.2.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Local MCP access to Unix pass/GPG with read-only defaults, path scopes, and TOTP" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PASSWORD_STORE_DIRPASSWORD_STORE_SIGNING_KEYPASSWORD_STORE_UMASKor--list-secret-keysConfiguration, not credentials: DISPLAY, GNUPGHOME, PASS_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS, PASS_MCP_AUDIT_LOG, PASS_MCP_REQUIRE_AGENT, WAYLAND_DISPLAY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso demo.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names demo.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PASSWORD_STORE_DIR, PASSWORD_STORE_SIGNING_KEY, PASSWORD_STORE_UMASK only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- Integration tests must mint their own throwaway GPG key in an ephemeral `GNUPGHOME`. Never touch the user's real `~/.gnupg` or `~/.password-store`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", "-b", "main", str(bare)], check=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."(default 600s, set via `default-cache-ttl` in ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf). "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.font_path = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."(pinentry-gnome3 / pinentry-qt / pinentry-gtk-2) in ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf, "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k in _PASS_ENV_PASSTHROUGH}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.listing = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(args, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."or switch pinentry-program in ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf to a GUI "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.listing = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MCP tools operating on synthetic credentialsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["pass", "git", "init"], capture_output=True, check=True, env=env, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.with subprocess.Popen(args, **kwargs) as process:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."then `gpgconf --kill gpg-agent`."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."a;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get install -y pass gnupgFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.packets = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo apt-get install -y pass gnupgFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.verify success ("Welcome", "Verify your email", redirect to /dashboard, …)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."a;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f" Fix: `chmod -R go-rwx {store_dir}`, or bypass with "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.listing = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(real_store), "branch", "-M", "main"], check=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."name;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.extension_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', {child!r}])\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.server.show("../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."name;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."https://alice:[email protected]/store.git?token=synthetic#secret"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for unix-pass-mcp@0.2.1 as of 9 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim neanderthal: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.