Skills/PyPI/unix-pass-mcp

unix-pass-mcp@0.2.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Local MCP access to Unix pass/GPG with read-only defaults, path scopes, and TOTP" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher neanderthal · publishing for 17 daysInstalls 341Last detonated 39 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PASSWORD_STORE_DIRPASSWORD_STORE_SIGNING_KEYPASSWORD_STORE_UMASK or --list-secret-keysConfiguration, not credentials: DISPLAY, GNUPGHOME, PASS_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS, PASS_MCP_AUDIT_LOG, PASS_MCP_REQUIRE_AGENT, WAYLAND_DISPLAY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso demo.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names demo.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PASSWORD_STORE_DIR, PASSWORD_STORE_SIGNING_KEY, PASSWORD_STORE_UMASK only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx unix-pass-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Integration tests must mint their own throwaway GPG key in an ephemeral `GNUPGHOME`. Never touch the user's real `~/.gnupg` or `~/.password-store`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_destructive_path.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/demo.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:124 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", "-b", "main", str(bare)], check=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/unix_pass_mcp/server.py:262 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"(default 600s, set via `default-cache-ttl` in ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf). "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:125 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/conftest.py:101 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/render_demo.py:20 · Python subprocess execution detectedfont_path = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/conftest.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/unix_pass_mcp/store.py:208 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"(pinentry-gnome3 / pinentry-qt / pinentry-gtk-2) in ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf, "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/conftest.py:90 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:40 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_destructive_path.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:89 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namessrc/unix_pass_mcp/pass_cli.py:80 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesenv = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k in _PASS_ENV_PASSTHROUGH}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_destructive_path.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedlisting = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/unix_pass_mcp/pass_cli.py:304 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(args, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/unix_pass_mcp/agent.py:226 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"or switch pinentry-program in ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf to a GUI "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/render_demo.py:90 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/conftest.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedlisting = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsdocs/demo.md:3 · Image alt text carrying instructionsMCP tools operating on synthetic credentialsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/render_demo.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["pass", "git", "init"], capture_output=True, check=True, env=env, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/unix_pass_mcp/pass_cli.py:313 · Python subprocess execution detectedwith subprocess.Popen(args, **kwargs) as process:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_otp_path.py:25 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/unix_pass_mcp/store.py:209 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"then `gpgconf --kill gpg-agent`."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_read_path.py:16 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/unit/test_destructive.py:105 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"a;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:31 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y pass gnupgFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:35 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:146 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_write_path.py:207 · Python subprocess execution detectedpackets = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:36 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y pass gnupgFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:30 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Account verification phishing language detected.claude/rules/agent-workflow.md:147 · Account verification phishing language detected · informational: not an instruction fileverify success ("Welcome", "Verify your email", redirect to /dashboard, …)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/unit/test_destructive.py:105 · Destructive file system command detected"a;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/unix_pass_mcp/server.py:898 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf" Fix: `chmod -R go-rwx {store_dir}`, or bypass with "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_write_path.py:183 · Python subprocess execution detectedlisting = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_otp_path.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_write_path.py:175 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_write_path.py:21 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_git_path.py:131 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(real_store), "branch", "-M", "main"], check=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/unit/test_security.py:46 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"name;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/integration/test_otp_path.py:107 · Python subprocess execution detectedextension_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/unit/test_runtime.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedf"subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', {child!r}])\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_writes.py:399 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_server.py:115 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesserver.show("../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/unit/test_security.py:46 · Destructive file system command detected"name;rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/unit/test_git_cmd.py:173 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://alice:[email protected]/store.git?token=synthetic#secret"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,354 tok
3 files · 71 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for unix-pass-mcp@0.2.1 as of 9 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim neanderthal: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim neanderthalPropose a patch to the maintainer