universal-mcp-agents@0.1.32
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Add your description here" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 51 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AGENTR_API_KEYAWS_ACCESS_KEY_IDAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEYRESEND_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTR_BASE_URL, AWS_REGION, CHAT_MODEL, FRONTEND_URL, LLM_TOOLS_LLM- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso ruzo.ai, agentr.dev, tmpfiles.org, tailwindcss.com, wikimedia.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ruzo.ai, agentr.dev, tmpfiles.org, tailwindcss.com, wikimedia.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AGENTR_API_KEY, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, RESEND_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- Requires `.env` file with auth tokensFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.coroutine = eval(compiled_code, namespace, namespace)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.`src/evals/datasets/search.json`, executes searches, computes simple accuracyFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.- Requires `.env` file with auth tokensFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Requires `.env` file with auth tokensFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."env": ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- [ ] Setup jailbreak guardrailsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.coroutine = eval(compiled_code, self.namespace, self.namespace)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.exec(class_def, namespace)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.exec(func_def, namespace)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.exec(import_stmt, namespace)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.exec("File = str", namespace)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.