Skills/PyPI/universal-mcp

universal-mcp@0.1.25

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Universal MCP acts as a middle ware for your API applications. It can store your credentials, authorize, enable disable apps on the fly and much more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher manoj-bajaj-manojbajaj95 · publishing for 297 daysInstalls 664Last detonated 30 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AGENTR_API_KEYAZURE_OPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTR_BASE_URL, AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION, AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT, AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso agentr.dev, open-meteo.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names agentr.dev, open-meteo.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AGENTR_API_KEY, AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx universal-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tests/test_api_generator.py:98 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesawait generate_api_from_schema(schema_path=Path("nonexistent.json"), output_path=None)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/universal_mcp/config.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingsrc/universal_mcp/utils/openapi/api_generator.py:52 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(module) # type: ignoreFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingsrc/universal_mcp/utils/openapi/api_generator.py:51 · Dynamic module loadingmodule = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/universal_mcp/config.py:98 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSettings can be loaded from environment variables or a .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingsrc/universal_mcp/utils/openapi/readme.py:13 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingsrc/universal_mcp/utils/openapi/readme.py:12 · Dynamic module loadingmodule = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/universal_mcp/integrations/integration.py:244 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringstr: A message instructing the user to provide the API keyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/universal_mcp/utils/openapi/api_splitter.py:341 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["black", str(segments_dir / segment_filename)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈75 tok
1 file · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim manoj-bajaj-manojbajaj95: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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