Skills/PyPI/universal-json-agent-mcp

universal-json-agent-mcp@0.3.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for advanced JSON parsing — load, query, aggregate, transform any JSON file from GitHub Copilot, Claude, Cursor, or any MCP client." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher gautamvhavle · publishing for 23 daysInstalls 391Last detonated 21 min ago
$claude mcp add universal-json-agent-mcp -- uvx universal-json-agent-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENROUTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OPENROUTER_MODEL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx universal-json-agent-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsweb/agent.py:91 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Set it in your environment or in a .env file."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:286 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>More test commands</b></summary> ```bash uv run pytest -v # verbose uv run pytest tests/test_tools/test_aggregate.py # one file uv run pytest -k "teFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsweb/config.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSet OPENROUTER_API_KEY in your environment or a .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:80 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>VS Code / GitHub Copilot</b></summary> Create `.vscode/mcp.json` in your workspace: ```json { "servers": { "universal-json-agent": { "type": "stdio"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:134 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>CLI / Standalone</b></summary> ```bash universal-json-agent-mcp # or uv run python -m universal_json_agent_mcp ``` Starts on **stdio** — pipe any MCFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsweb/config.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv() # reads .env from project rootFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈78 tok
1 file · 66 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.