Skills/PyPI/universal-db-mcp

universal-db-mcp@1.1.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Universal database MCP server for PostgreSQL, SQLite, MySQL, and DuckDB" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fashad-ahmed-fashad.ahmed20 · publishing for 162 daysInstalls 131Last detonated 21 min ago
$claude mcp add universal-db-mcp -- uvx universal-db-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MYSQL_PASSWORDPOSTGRES_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE, DRYRUN, DUCKDB_PATH, DUCKDB_READONLY, ENABLE_LOGGING, MAX_JOINS, MAX_RESULT_ROWS, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MYSQL_DB, MYSQL_HOST, MYSQL_MAX_CONN, MYSQL_PORT, MYSQL_READONLY, MYSQL_SSL, MYSQL_URI, MYSQL_USER, POSTGRES_DB, POSTGRES_HOST, POSTGRES_MAX_CONN, POSTGRES_PORT, POSTGRES_READONLY, POSTGRES_SSL, POSTGRES_URI, POSTGRES_USER, QUERY_TIMEOUT, RATE_LIMIT_BURST, RATE_LIMIT_RPM, SQLITE_PATH, SQLITE_READONLY, WARN_SELECT_STAR_NO_LIMIT, WHITELISTED_TABLES
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MYSQL_PASSWORD, POSTGRES_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx universal-db-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_duckdb_adapter.py:154 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait duck.query("SELECT * FROM read_csv('/etc/passwd')")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:13 · Image alt text carrying instructionsDemo: schema discovery, a real query, a blocked DROP, and dry-run modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_duckdb_adapter.py:169 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait duck.query("SELECT * FROM glob('/home/*/.env')")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_duckdb_adapter.py:184 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait duck.explain("SELECT * FROM read_csv('/etc/passwd')")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.