unitmcp@0.1.69
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "UnitMCP package for MCP hardware integration with Ollama LLM and Raspberry Pi hardware control." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 52 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYCLAUDE_API_KEYGOOGLE_API_KEYGOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALSOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SIMULATION- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso unitapi.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names unitapi.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, CLAUDE_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
--ssh-key-path=<path> Path to SSH key (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env.development",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.--ssh-key-path=<path> Path to SSH key (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.--ssh-key-path=<path> Path to SSH key (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudo systemctl stop avahi-daemon.service", # Stop Avahi daemonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.--ssh-key-path=<path> Path to SSH key (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.ping_result = subprocess.run(ping_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout*2)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."sudo systemctl disable avahi-daemon.service", # Disable Avahi daemonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.exec(f.read(), version)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."sudo systemctl stop bluetooth.service",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.search_paths: List of paths to search for .env files (optional)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Otherwise, search for .env files in the search pathsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print(f" {Fore.CYAN}Has .env.example:{Style.RESET_ALL} {'Yes' if example.get('env_example') else 'No'}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.cmd = f"sudo apt-get install --only-upgrade -y {package_name}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.cmd = "sudo apt-get install -y"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."sudo systemctl stop bluetooth.service", # Stop Bluetooth serviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.returncode, stdout, stderr = await self.connection.execute_command("sudo apt-get update")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Load environment variables from .env files.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Add the server stop command (kill the Python process running the server)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.env_file: Path to the .env file (optional)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Create or update .env file for an example.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.cmd = f"sudo apt-get remove -y {package_name}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- **Simulation Mode**: Test setup scripts without physical hardware or sudo privilegesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."sudo systemctl disable bluetooth.service", # Disable Bluetooth serviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.cmd = f"sudo {self.python_executable} -m pip install"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.from .env files and the system environment. It provides a consistent way toFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print(f" {Fore.CYAN}Has .env:{Style.RESET_ALL} {'Yes' if example.get('env_file') else 'No'}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for unitmcp@0.1.69 as of 3 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tom-sapletta: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.