unifi-mcp@0.5.3
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Unofficial MCP server for the UniFi Site Manager, Access, and Network APIs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 16 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openhab.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
1. Environment variables / .env file (via Pydantic Settings) — already handledFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.C -->|Priority 3 Lower| D[.env file]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Option 2 — .env file ({KEYRING_SERVICE}/.env):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_value: Value already loaded from env/.env by PydanticFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.1. Environment variables / .env file (via Pydantic Settings)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.process = subprocess.Popen(command, env=env, close_fds=True) # nosec B603 - Popen with explicit env and no shell, validated by callerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.env_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…s or the `[tool.unifi-mcp]` table in `pyproject.toml`. Keep secrets in ignored `.env` files, enable SSL verification when targeting production controllers, and rest…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.with patch("os.kill"): # Mock os.kill to avoid killing real processFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.env_file = ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.1. `.env` fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."....//....//....//etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.# Use current process PID (safe to kill in test)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.KEYRING_AVAILABLE = importlib.util.find_spec("keyring") is not NoneFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Update the "AI Code Generation Best Practices" checklist in CLAUDE.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Mock os.kill to avoid actually killing the test processFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Verify kill was called (is_running calls os.kill with signal 0, then stop_server calls with SIGTERM)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."default | cat /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{"monday": {"start": "../etc/passwd", "end": "17:00"}},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.importlib.util.find_spec("fastmcp.server.middleware.rate_limiting") is not NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.SERVERPANELS_AVAILABLE = importlib.util.find_spec("mcp_common.ui") is not NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."default; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- AI assistants should update CLAUDE.md and RULES.md weekly or after pre-commit failuresFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.EXCEPTIONS_AVAILABLE = importlib.util.find_spec("mcp_common.exceptions") is not NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ACCESS_CONTROLLER__USERNAME=adminFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."default; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.