understand-mcp@0.1.7
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "UNDERSTAND - repository-wide code intelligence, security and defect analysis engine with a CLI and an MCP server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso mitre.org, python.org, owasp.org, oasis-open.org, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".env", ".env.*", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "*.keystore", ".htpasswd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.p = subprocess.run([exe, *a], cwd=str(root), env=env, capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.extensions=frozenset({".txt", ".cfg", ".ini", ".properties", ".env.example"}),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."USAGE\n python -m understand.mcp_server [stdio|streamable-http|sse]\n\n"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.subprocess.Popen(["xdg-open", str(path)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".env", ".env.local", ".env.production", ".netrc", "_netrc", ".htpasswd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.os.startfile(str(path)) # type: ignore[attr-defined]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(["open", str(path)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."credentials", "*.netrc", ".aws/credentials", "*.kdbx",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.RUN mkdir -p /data && chown understand:understand /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim understand-mcp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.