unblu-mcp@0.10.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A model context protocol server for interacting with Unblu deployments." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
UNBLU_API_KEYUNBLU_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: UNBLU_BASE_URL, UNBLU_TRUSTED_HEADERS, UNBLU_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- unblu.cloud (its own)Also python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names python.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects UNBLU_API_KEY, UNBLU_PASSWORD only into requests to unblu.cloud (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
update-template = { shell = "copier update --trust . --skip-answered --defaults && uv sync --upgrade && prek autoupdate && echo ' ✓ Dependencies upgraded and hook versions updated'" }Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.self._port_forward_process = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.inspect = "DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH=true npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/inspector uv run unblu-mcp"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.auth_check = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for unblu-mcp@0.10.1 as of 2 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.