Skills/PyPI/uk-due-diligence-mcp

uk-due-diligence-mcp@1.7.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "UK due diligence MCP server — Companies House, Charity Commission, HMLR, Gazette, sanctions" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher paulieb89 · publishing for 345 daysInstalls 1,151Last detonated 34 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso thegazette.co.uk, service.gov.uk, charitycommission.gov.uk, fcdo.gov.uk, treas.gov, europa.eu, un.org, data.gov.uk, fly.dev, glama.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx uk-due-diligence-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.6.1

vet-skills diff uk-due-diligence-mcp 1.6.1 1.7.0

This version reaches for something 1.6.1 did not: 10 new hosts (charitycommission.gov.uk, data.gov.uk, europa.eu, fcdo.gov.uk, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
charitycommission.gov.uk, data.gov.uk, europa.eu, fcdo.gov.uk, fly.dev, glama.ai, service.gov.uk, thegazette.co.uk, treas.gov, un.org

1.6.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:200 · Destructive file system command detected{ "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": { "command": "rm -rf /tmp/build" }, ... }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:187 · Destructive file system command detectedNow suppose Claude Code decides to run `Bash "rm -rf /tmp/build"` against the macOS/Linux config. Here's what happens:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:3301 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering"message": "Please provide your credentials",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_company_filing_document.py:148 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", ["", "../../etc/passwd", "abc/def", "abc?x=1", "abc#frag", "abc def"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_packaging.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedbuild = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:225 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… } } ``` If the command had been a safer `rm` variant like `rm file.txt`, the script would hit `exit 0` instead. Exit code 0 with no output means the hook has no decision to report, so the tool call continues through th…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_pre_bash_deploy.py:240 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs/BACKLOG.md:24 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file… a comment-parsing extension can. - 2026-09-08: Whichever TODO convention wins, write it down — marker vocabulary and where it is scanned — in this repo's `CLAUDE.md` or the global one, since an unrecorded convention binds nobody and drift…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env for local developmentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detected.claude/hooks/check_invariants.py:196 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:321 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…Changed](#filechanged)) | `.envrc\|.env` …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:99 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions… it to `.claude/hooks/block-rm.sh` in your project and make it executable with `chmod +x .claude/hooks/block-rm.sh` so Claude Code can run it: ```bash theme={nul…Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_packaging.py:52 · Python subprocess execution detectedinstall = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detected.claude/hooks/post_edit_python.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_check_deploy_drift.py:76 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_check_deploy_drift.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_packaging.py:77 · Python subprocess execution detectedimport_check = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:1486 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsSave this script to `.claude/hooks/plain-display.sh` in your project and make it executable with `chmod +x`:Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:209 · Destructive file system command detected…e="If condition checks"> The `if` condition `"Bash(rm *)"` matches because `rm -rf /tmp/build` is a subcommand matching `rm *`, so this handler spawns. If the comma…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:442 · Destructive file system command detected| `Bash(rm *)` | `echo $(rm -rf /)` | yes | commands inside `$()` and backticks are checked; `rm -rf /` matches |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:2872 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…orktrees) is not processed. If you need to copy local configuration files like `.env` into the new worktree, do it inside your hook script. The hook must return th…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_pre_bash_deploy.py:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_pre_bash_deploy.py:151 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_pre_bash_deploy.py:253 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:3637 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions…`.claude/hooks/run-tests-async.sh` in your project and make it executable with `chmod +x`: ```bash theme={null} #!/bin/bash # run-tests-async.sh # Read hook input f…Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_company_filing_document.py:96 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/document/abc", # userinfoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_company_filing_document.py:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"https://document-api.company-information.service.gov.uk/document/../../etc/passwd", # traversalFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/hooks/HOOKS-REF.md:2797 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…gment is registered as a literal filename in the working directory, so `".envrc|.env"` watches exactly those two files. Regex patterns are not useful here: a value …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈901 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim paulieb89: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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