Skills/PyPI/uipath-mcp

uipath-mcp@0.3.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "UiPath MCP SDK" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher uipath · publishing for 590 daysInstalls 140KLast detonated 13 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 26 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CLIENT_SECRETUIPATH_ACCESS_TOKENUIPATH_CLIENT_SECRET or --client-secretConfiguration, not credentials: GITHUB_MCP_SERVER_URL, SLACK_CHANNEL_ID, SLACK_MCP_SERVER_URL, UIPATH_CLIENT_ID, UIPATH_CLIENT_SCOPE, UIPATH_MCP_SERVER_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for CLIENT_SECRET, UIPATH_ACCESS_TOKEN, UIPATH_CLIENT_SECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx uipath-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 15 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'dotenv'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'dotenv'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'uipath'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
15sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
15sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
15sprocess8 of 26 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
15sprocessscript backend runs setup only
15sprocessscript backend runs setup only
15sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Unpinned dependency.github/workflows/commitlint.yml:37 · Unpinned dependencynpm install commitlint@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstestcases/datetime-server/run.sh:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessed -i '/^UIPATH_TENANT_ID=[[:space:]]*$/d' .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtestcases/string-server/run.sh:7 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $MCP_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/cli/test_runtime_extra.py:192 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesproc.kill = MagicMock()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtestcases/ground-to-cloud/run.sh:7 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $MCP_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/commitlint.yml:47 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx commitlint --from ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} --to pr_branch --verboseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstestcases/ground-to-cloud/run.sh:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessed -i '/^UIPATH_TENANT_ID=[[:space:]]*$/d' .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstestcases/string-server/run.sh:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessed -i '/^UIPATH_TENANT_ID=[[:space:]]*$/d' .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/uipath_mcp/_cli/_utils/_diagnose.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedreadelf_output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/commitlint.yml:28 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/commitlint.yml:29 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y gitFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/uipath_mcp/_cli/_utils/_diagnose.py:22 · Python subprocess execution detectedfile_output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtestcases/datetime-server/run.sh:7 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $MCP_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈39 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for uipath-mcp@0.3.2 as of 2 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim uipath: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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