uipath-mcp@0.3.2
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "UiPath MCP SDK" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 26 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CLIENT_SECRETUIPATH_ACCESS_TOKENUIPATH_CLIENT_SECRETor--client-secretConfiguration, not credentials: GITHUB_MCP_SERVER_URL, SLACK_CHANNEL_ID, SLACK_MCP_SERVER_URL, UIPATH_CLIENT_ID, UIPATH_CLIENT_SCOPE, UIPATH_MCP_SERVER_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for CLIENT_SECRET, UIPATH_ACCESS_TOKEN, UIPATH_CLIENT_SECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 15 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
npm install commitlint@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.sed -i '/^UIPATH_TENANT_ID=[[:space:]]*$/d' .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.kill $MCP_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc.kill = MagicMock()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill $MCP_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.npx commitlint --from ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} --to pr_branch --verboseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.sed -i '/^UIPATH_TENANT_ID=[[:space:]]*$/d' .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sed -i '/^UIPATH_TENANT_ID=[[:space:]]*$/d' .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.readelf_output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get install -y gitFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.file_output = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill $MCP_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for uipath-mcp@0.3.2 as of 2 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim uipath: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.