ui-blackbox-mcp@0.2.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "UI Blackbox Tester MCP — natural-language UI testing for Claude Desktop via Playwright" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
<summary><b>Gemini CLI</b></summary> Edit `~/.gemini/settings.json`: ```json { "mcpServers": { "ui-blackbox": { "command": "<ABS>/.venv/bin/python", "args": ["-Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.out = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.user's home (same trust level as the chrome-profile dir), is chmod 0600 onFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "sid=xyz" in await session.page.evaluate("document.cookie")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.# Detach must NOT kill the user's browser.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."localStorage.setItem('tok','abc'); document.cookie='sid=xyz'")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for ui-blackbox-mcp@0.2.0 as of 10 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim windowhyun: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- document.cookie access≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.