Skills/PyPI/tv-mcp

tv-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Trading Volatility — discover and retrieve options market-structure data (GEX, gamma, skew, options flow, ranked trade setups) conversationally over the public v2 API." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher tradingvolatility · publishing for 159 daysInstalls 61Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add tv-mcp -- uvx tv-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TV_API_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso tradingvolatility.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names tradingvolatility.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TV_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tv-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.4sprocess8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tv_mcp/settings.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ``Settings`` — server-level config from environment / ``.env`` (base URL, log level, bindFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tv_mcp/settings.py:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Server-level configuration, read from environment variables / ``.env``."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tv_mcp/tools/_common.py:101 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Add your Trading Volatility API key to config.json or send it as an "Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tv_mcp/settings.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tv_mcp/tools/auth.py:44 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"config.json (local) or send an Authorization: Bearer <key> header (remote)."Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈818 tok
2 files · 24 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tv-mcp@0.2.0 as of 13 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.