Skills/PyPI/tts-mcp-server

tts-mcp-server@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "TTS MCP server: text-to-speech, AI voiceover, voice cloning and SRT/VTT subtitles for Claude, Cursor, Codex and other AI agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher rty2345rr · publishing for 12 daysInstalls 198Last detonated 46 min ago
$claude mcp add tts-mcp-server -- uvx tts-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MIRAGEA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MIRAGEA_BASE_URL, MIRAGEA_OUTPUT_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso miragea.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names miragea.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MIRAGEA_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tts-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tools.py:134 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files({"text": "Hi", "reference_audio_url": "file:///etc/passwd"}, "public http"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)skills/miragea-voiceover/SKILL.md:16 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…all the server: `claude mcp add tts -s user -e MIRAGEA_API_KEY=<key> -- uvx tts-mcp-server` (other clients: `uvx tts-mcp-server --print-config <client>`). Keys are created at https://miragea.ai/workspace/api (setup guide: https://miragea.a…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_tools.py:28 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingmonkeypatch.setenv("MIRAGEA_BASE_URL", "https://user:[email protected]/v1")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/miragea_voice_mcp/client.py:31 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkUSER_AGENT = f"tts-mcp-server/{__version__} (+https://github.com/RTY2345RR/miragea-voice-mcp) python-httpx"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Collects environment variables by secret-like namestests/test_cli_and_stdio.py:68 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesenv = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != "MIRAGEA_API_KEY"}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_and_stdio.py:69 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,361 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tts-mcp-server@0.1.1 as of 13 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

tts-mcp-server@0.1.1 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills