trust-gate-mcp@0.4.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for TrustGate — tamper-evident receipts for agent actions and a read-only-allowlist decision gate. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65. Offline integrity check." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TRUST_GATE_API_KEYTRUST_GATE_BEARER_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: OAO_RECEIPT_KEY, OAO_REQUIRE_PQ, OLLAMA_BASE_URL, OLLAMA_HOST, TRUST_GATE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TRUST_GATE_API_URL, TRUST_GATE_FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS, TRUST_GATE_REQUIRE_PQ, TRUST_GATE_TENANT_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso smithery.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names smithery.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TRUST_GATE_API_KEY, TRUST_GATE_BEARER_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# as does any hidden or parent-directory segment (.env, .ssh, .git, ..). A bare name with noFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.inner_mcp_app = mcp_server.streamable_http_app()Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.