Skills/PyPI/trueconf-server-mcp

trueconf-server-mcp@0.3.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "MCP server bridging LLM clients to TrueConf Server — manage conferences, recordings, invitations via Model Context Protocol." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher trueconf · publishing for 45 daysInstalls 65Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_TOKEN_TTLAUTH_MODETRUECONF_SECRET or --client-secret / --api-token-ttlConfiguration, not credentials: AI_SERVER_URL, CODE_MODE_EXPERIMENTAL, DISCOVERY_MODE, FASTMCP_SHOW_SERVER_BANNER, HTTP_TIMEOUT, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_NO_TLS, MCP_TLS_CERT, MCP_TLS_KEY, TRUECONF_CLIENT_ID, TRUECONF_MCP_PORT, TRUECONF_SERVER, TRUECONF_VERIFY_SSL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso trueconf.name — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_code_mode.py:35 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert "https://10.100.2.108/" in resultFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_ai_auth.py:70 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetmock_config_set.ai_server_url = "http://10.110.2.39"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**CLI flags > env vars > `.env` > дефолты кода.**Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_code_mode.py:19 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetmcp_base_url="https://10.100.2.108",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addressapp/mcp/auth/trueconf_server_ai.py:55 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"sai01t.trueconf.name (https by default) or http://10.110.2.39 "Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# с .env файлом (см. ниже):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandAGENTS.md:69 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges…д на конкретный интерфейс (`127.0.0.1:443`) требует root. - **Linux**: требует `sudo setcap cap_net_bind_service+ep $(which python)` (один раз при установке) либо за…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmain.py:283 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. .env file (loaded via python-dotenv)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmain.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env into os.environ BEFORE Typer parses envvars. App modules no longerFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addressAGENTS.md:57 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target- `https://10.100.2.108` → SAN `[10.100.2.108]`Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addressAGENTS.md:49 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target…пр. `sai01t.trueconf.name` — `https://` подставится сам; для plain-HTTP — явно `http://10.110.2.39`). Нужен для transcription-тул. Адрес НЕ берётся из TCS API (`GET /servers-ai` …Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addressmain.py:273 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"http://10.110.2.39 for plain HTTP"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandapp/tls.py:247 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"`sudo setcap cap_net_bind_service+ep $(which python)` "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_tls.py:24 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target("https://10.100.2.108:443", ["10.100.2.108"]),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_tls.py:23 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target("https://10.100.2.108", ["10.100.2.108"]),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_config.py:27 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target(False, None, "https://10.100.2.108", 443, "https://10.100.2.108"),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_ai_auth.py:73 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert sai_base == "http://10.110.2.39"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapp/config.py:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files+ ". Provide via CLI flag, environment variable, or .env file."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. **`.env` файл** — загружается через `python-dotenv` (`load_dotenv()` в начале `main.py`). Пример: `.env.example`. Реальный `.env` в `.gitignore`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:160 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file> | **macOS** | Binding to `0.0.0.0:80` or `0.0.0.0:443` works without root privileges |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈7,409 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim trueconf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. URL to a private-network address≈ +1 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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