tradingview-mcp@0.9.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Advanced AI Trading Intelligence Framework — MCP server with live market intelligence, trade analytics, strategy optimization, pattern recognition, walk-forward backtesting, and 73 technical analysis tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 38 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PROXY_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: DEBUG_MCP, HTTP_BACKOFF_BASE, PROXY_ENABLED, PROXY_HOST, PROXY_PORT, PROXY_SESSION_MAX, PROXY_SESSION_MIN, PROXY_USERNAME_PREFIX, SCREENER_BATCH_SIZE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso yahoo.com, coindesk.com, cointelegraph.com, reuters.com, ipinfo.io, reddit.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names yahoo.com, coindesk.com, cointelegraph.com, reuters.com, ipinfo.io, reddit.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PROXY_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
NYSE:DANFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Reads Webshare proxy credentials from ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES only.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from __future__ import annotationsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.# Try loading .env file if python-dotenv is availableFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return f"http://{c['prefix']}-{session_id}:{c['password']}@{c['host']}:{c['port']}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from __future__ import annotationsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._env_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "../../../../.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Or create a .env file (see .env.example) — never commit .env to git.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from __future__ import annotationsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.from __future__ import annotationsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim debarpan2000: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.