Skills/PyPI/trading-swarm-mcp

trading-swarm-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Local stdio MCP servers extracted from the trading swarm: point-in-time data assembly, pre-trade invariant + leakage auditing, and regime-fragility probing." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher blink1217 · publishing for 80 daysInstalls 127Last detonated 12 min ago
$claude mcp add trading-swarm-mcp -- uvx trading-swarm-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ALPACA_API_KEYALPACA_SECRETFINNHUB_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: GYM_GUARDRAILS_DIR, SWARM_MCP_BYOK, SWARM_MCP_CACHE_DB, SWARM_MCP_TELEMETRY_OPT_IN
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso 21initiative.com, finnhub.io, alpaca.markets — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names 21initiative.com, finnhub.io, alpaca.markets as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ALPACA_API_KEY, ALPACA_SECRET, FINNHUB_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx trading-swarm-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_pins.py:12 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

No other findings across 6,173 lines in 72 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈78 tok
1 file · 72 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.