Skills/PyPI/tradeiq-mcp

tradeiq-mcp@0.3.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Standalone MCP server: real point-in-time market data and a multi-agent equity research pipeline as tools for Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 728 daysInstalls 111Last detonated 13 min ago
$claude mcp add tradeiq-mcp -- uvx tradeiq-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FRED_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SEC_EDGAR_USER_AGENT, TRADINGAGENTS_CACHE_DIR, TRADINGAGENTS_MEMORY_LOG_PATH, TRADINGAGENTS_RESULTS_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso stlouisfed.org, polymarket.com, reddit.com, sec.gov, stocktwits.com, yahoo.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names stlouisfed.org, polymarket.com, reddit.com, sec.gov, stocktwits.com, yahoo.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FRED_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tradeiq-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvendor/tradingagents/tradingagents/__init__.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env files at package import so DEFAULT_CONFIG's env-var overlayFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvendor/tradingagents/tradingagents/default_config.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# their .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvendor/tradingagents/tradingagents/__init__.py:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# the project's .env instead of stepping up from site-packages.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"<script>bad()</script> <img src='http://x.invalid/y'> <link rel=attachment href='file:///etc/passwd'>\n\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvendor/tradingagents/tradingagents/__init__.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(find_dotenv(".env.enterprise", usecwd=True), override=False)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tradeiq_mcp/tools/export.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesa hidden folder such as ~/.ssh), and never replace an existing file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈73 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.