Skills/PyPI/tracker-mcp

tracker-mcp@0.8.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for your job-application tracker in Excel, CSV or Google Sheets: follow-ups, funnel, safe confirmed writes" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher butyavk · publishing for 26 daysInstalls 1,531Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add tracker-mcp -- uvx tracker-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALSTRACKER_GOOGLE_TOKEN or --client-secretConfiguration, not credentials: TRACKER_ALLOW_UNCONFIRMED, TRACKER_BACKUP_DIR, TRACKER_CONFIG, TRACKER_DIALOG_ONLY, TRACKER_GOOGLE_CLIENT, TRACKER_MCP_DEBUG, TRACKER_MCP_HOME, TRACKER_PATH, TRACKER_READ_ONLY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, claude.ai, claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com, claude.ai, claude.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, TRACKER_GOOGLE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tracker-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_scaffold.py:290 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun = lambda *a: subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "tracker_mcp.server", *a], # noqa: E731Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_round5.py:181 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentfor ch in "؜⁠­᠎​‮\U000e0069
\x85":Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_scaffold.py:158 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun = lambda *a: subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "tracker_mcp.server", *a], # noqa: E731Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_round5.py:268 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content directionfor text in ("a‮b", "a​b", "a\U000E0069b", "a­b", "ab"):Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_config.py:138 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "tracker_mcp.server", "--check"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_stores.py:184 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "tracker_mcp.server", "--tracker", str(book), "--config",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/tracker_mcp/remote/app.py:318 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"""Wire the shared MCPServer for HTTP with sign-in, and return (remote, ASGI app)."""Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_config.py:142 · Python subprocess execution detectedbad = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "tracker_mcp.server", "--check"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_round5.py:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesforged2 = {**entry, "at": "2099-01-02T00:00:00", "backup": "../../etc/passwd", "tracker": t.store.label}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_stores.py:43 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentpath.write_bytes("Company;Role;Status;Date Applied\nAcme;EM;Applied;09/02/2026\n".encode())Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_stores.py:188 · Python subprocess execution detectedex = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "tracker_mcp.server", "example"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_stores.py:222 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "tracker_mcp.server", "--tracker", str(path), "--check"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_round5.py:181 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content directionfor ch in "؜⁠­᠎​‮\U000e0069
\x85":Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_round5.py:265 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentfor text in ("👨‍👩‍👧", "🏳️‍🌈", "\U0001F3F4\U000E0067\U000E0062\U000E0073\U000E0063\U000E0074\U000E007F",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈65 tok
1 file · 42 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tracker-mcp@0.8.4 as of 6 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

tracker-mcp@0.8.4 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills