Skills/PyPI/traackr-api-mcp

traackr-api-mcp@0.4.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Traackr API v1, generated from its OpenAPI spec." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher traackr · publishing for 21 daysInstalls 211Last detonated 13 min ago
$claude mcp add traackr-api-mcp -- uvx traackr-api-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TRAACKR_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, TRAACKR_API_BASE_URL, TRAACKR_OPENAPI_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso traackr.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names traackr.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TRAACKR_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx traackr-api-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/traackr_mcp/server.py:299 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Deliberately no .env: the hosted server reads the process environmentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/traackr_mcp/server.py:69 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# The spec fetch blocks startup, and MCP clients kill a stdio server that takesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_http_transport.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``TRAACKR_API_KEY``, and must not read ``.env``. FastMCP'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_http_transport.py:234 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# refusal, and the pod has no .env — so HTTP mode never loads one.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/traackr_mcp/server.py:294 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# A .env beside a checkout is a developer convenience for the local install;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_http_transport.py:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# A laptop .env carrying the stdio key must not trip the server-wide keyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/traackr_mcp/server.py:300 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# only, exactly as the pod does — so a laptop .env holding the stdio keyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/traackr_mcp/server.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswhose key comes from TRAACKR_API_KEY; a `.env` beside aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.