Skills/PyPI/tplink-modem-mcp

tplink-modem-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for TP-Link routers and ISP modems: devices, Wi-Fi signal, logs, presence history" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher yakupemreyerli · publishing for 4 daysInstalls 246Last detonated 21 min ago
$claude mcp add tplink-modem-mcp -- uvx tplink-modem-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TPLINK_PASSWORDTPLINK_SHOW_SECRETSConfiguration, not credentials: TPLINK_CLIENT, TPLINK_HOST, TPLINK_LOG, TPLINK_PRESENCE_INTERVAL, TPLINK_STATE_DIR, TPLINK_TIMEOUT, TPLINK_USERNAME, TPLINK_WRITE, XDG_STATE_HOME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TPLINK_PASSWORD, TPLINK_SHOW_SECRETS and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tplink-modem-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
URL to a private-network addresssrc/tplink_modem_mcp/router.py:23 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetself.host = os.environ.get("TPLINK_HOST", "http://192.168.1.1").rstrip("/")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

No other findings across 1,209 lines in 10 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.