Skills/PyPI/totvs-moda-mcp

totvs-moda-mcp@3.12.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server para API V2 do TOTVS Moda — integre Claude e outros clientes MCP ao seu ERP de moda brasileiro" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fabianoomura · publishing for 217 daysInstalls 117Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add totvs-moda-mcp -- uvx totvs-moda-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TOTVS_CLIENT_SECRETTOTVS_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: TOTVS_BASE_URL, TOTVS_BRANCH_CODES, TOTVS_CACHE_ENABLED, TOTVS_CACHE_TTL, TOTVS_CLIENT_ID, TOTVS_DEFAULT_COST_CODES, TOTVS_DEFAULT_PRICE_CODES, TOTVS_DEFAULT_STOCK_CODES, TOTVS_ENABLE_ANALYTICS, TOTVS_ENV_FILE, TOTVS_MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS, TOTVS_MAX_RETRIES, TOTVS_OPERATION_CONTEXT, TOTVS_OUTPUT_DIR, TOTVS_PROFILE, TOTVS_TLS_VERIFY, TOTVS_USAGE_ENABLED, TOTVS_USAGE_FILE, TOTVS_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TOTVS_CLIENT_SECRET, TOTVS_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx totvs-moda-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_output_files.py:30 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsJPG_BYTES = b"\xff\xd8\xff\xe0\x00\x10JFIF" + b"\x00" * 200Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load a local .env file without adding a runtime dependency.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_server_env.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = tmp_path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:115 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescandidates = [Path(explicit)] if explicit else [Path.cwd() / ".env", Path(__file__).resolve().parent / ".env"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_server_env.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = tmp_path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:104 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesDefault behavior is conservative: .env only fills missing variables.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstools/_defaults.py:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"and no default is configured. Set TOTVS_BRANCH_CODES in your .env or "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstools/product.py:1860 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Padrão do .env se omitido"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsclaude_desktop_config.example.json:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"TOTVS_ENV_FILE": "C:\\caminho\\para\\totvs-moda-mcp\\.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstools/product.py:1787 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Padrão do .env se omitido"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstools/product.py:1828 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Padrão do .env se omitido"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:105 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSet TOTVS_DOTENV_OVERRIDE=true to force .env to replace inherited env vars.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,734 tok
3 files · 71 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for totvs-moda-mcp@3.12.0 as of 38 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

totvs-moda-mcp@3.12.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills