Skills/PyPI/topsyde-llm-wiki-mcp

topsyde-llm-wiki-mcp@0.3.10

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing llm-wiki second-brain queries to AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher liad-goren-khgs2411 · publishing for 410 daysInstalls 145Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PYPI_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: LLM_WIKI_AUTO_UPDATE, LLM_WIKI_PROJECT, LLM_WIKI_ROOT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PYPI_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx topsyde-llm-wiki-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationCLAUDE.md:29 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime… verification would be costly or ambiguous. - `enrich_gap` defaults to detached auto-update. Omit `auto_update` or pass `auto_update=True` unless the operator explicitly wants to queue the note without running update; `auto_update=False` s…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild.sh:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files. .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationllm_wiki_mcp.py:874 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimedef enrich_gap(project_key: str, gap_id: str, notes: str, auto_update: bool | None = True) -> dict:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Dynamic module loadingllm_wiki_mcp.py:183 · Dynamic module loadingmodule = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild.sh:72 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedllm_wiki_mcp.py:420 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingllm_wiki_mcp.py:319 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationllm_wiki_mcp.py:369 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeif auto_update is True:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationllm_wiki_mcp.py:368 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimedef _auto_update_requested(auto_update: bool | None) -> tuple[bool, str]:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Dynamic module loadingllm_wiki_mcp.py:318 · Dynamic module loadingmodule = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationCLAUDE.md:21 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime- `enrich_gap(..., auto_update=...)` can detach `make update PROJECT=<key> AUTO=1` through the repo-local wrapper when enabledFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsllm_wiki_mcp.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath = Path.cwd() / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild.sh:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files: "${PYPI_TOKEN:?PYPI_TOKEN not set - export it or put it in mcp/.env}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationllm_wiki_mcp.py:896 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime`auto_update` omitted or set to `True` unless the operator explicitlyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Dynamic module loadingllm_wiki_mcp.py:184 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationllm_wiki_mcp.py:406 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimedef _trigger_auto_update(project_dir: Path, project_key: str) -> tuple[bool, str, str | None]:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈599 tok
2 files · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for topsyde-llm-wiki-mcp@0.3.10 as of 28 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim liad-goren-khgs2411: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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