topsyde-llm-wiki-mcp@0.3.10
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing llm-wiki second-brain queries to AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PYPI_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: LLM_WIKI_AUTO_UPDATE, LLM_WIKI_PROJECT, LLM_WIKI_ROOT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PYPI_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
… verification would be costly or ambiguous. - `enrich_gap` defaults to detached auto-update. Omit `auto_update` or pass `auto_update=True` unless the operator explicitly wants to queue the note without running update; `auto_update=False` s…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.. .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.def enrich_gap(project_key: str, gap_id: str, notes: str, auto_update: bool | None = True) -> dict:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [[ -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if auto_update is True:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.def _auto_update_requested(auto_update: bool | None) -> tuple[bool, str]:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- `enrich_gap(..., auto_update=...)` can detach `make update PROJECT=<key> AUTO=1` through the repo-local wrapper when enabledFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.path = Path.cwd() / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.: "${PYPI_TOKEN:?PYPI_TOKEN not set - export it or put it in mcp/.env}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.`auto_update` omitted or set to `True` unless the operator explicitlyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.def _trigger_auto_update(project_dir: Path, project_key: str) -> tuple[bool, str, str | None]:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for topsyde-llm-wiki-mcp@0.3.10 as of 28 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim liad-goren-khgs2411: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.