Skills/PyPI/token-context-mcp

token-context-mcp@0.3.10

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "On-demand, local code-context MCP server for AI coding agents with Tree-sitter AST & provenance-aware retrieval." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mck564 · publishing for 23 daysInstalls 655Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TOKEN_CONTEXT_ADMIN_TOKENTOKEN_CONTEXT_BODY_MODE_BEHAVIORTOKEN_CONTEXT_CONFIGTOKEN_CONTEXT_DEP_VENDOREDTOKEN_CONTEXT_FAMILY_CAPTOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_DOC_COMMENTSTOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_INTERFACE_DOCTOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_WORD_FORMSTOKEN_CONTEXT_GUI_DEBUGTOKEN_CONTEXT_IMPL_RANKINGTOKEN_CONTEXT_INDEX_WORKERSTOKEN_CONTEXT_OLLAMA_ENDPOINTTOKEN_CONTEXT_OVERLOAD_COLLAPSETOKEN_CONTEXT_QUERY_WORD_FORMSTOKEN_CONTEXT_TRACE_SQL
Where it talks to
token-context-mcp.local (its own)Also in-toto.io, slsa.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names in-toto.io, slsa.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TOKEN_CONTEXT_ADMIN_TOKEN, TOKEN_CONTEXT_BODY_MODE_BEHAVIOR, TOKEN_CONTEXT_CONFIG, TOKEN_CONTEXT_DEP_VENDORED, TOKEN_CONTEXT_FAMILY_CAP, TOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_DOC_COMMENTS, TOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_INTERFACE_DOC, TOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_WORD_FORMS, TOKEN_CONTEXT_GUI_DEBUG, TOKEN_CONTEXT_IMPL_RANKING, TOKEN_CONTEXT_INDEX_WORKERS, TOKEN_CONTEXT_OLLAMA_ENDPOINT, TOKEN_CONTEXT_OVERLOAD_COLLAPSE, TOKEN_CONTEXT_QUERY_WORD_FORMS, TOKEN_CONTEXT_TRACE_SQL only into requests to token-context-mcp.local (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets TOKEN_CONTEXT_ADMIN_TOKEN=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_BODY_MODE_BEHAVIOR=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_CONFIG=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_DEP_VENDORED=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_FAMILY_CAP=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_DOC_COMMENTS=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_INTERFACE_DOC=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_FTS_WORD_FORMS=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_GUI_DEBUG=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_IMPL_RANKING=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_INDEX_WORKERS=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_OLLAMA_ENDPOINT=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_OVERLOAD_COLLAPSE=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_QUERY_WORD_FORMS=token-context-mcp.local,TOKEN_CONTEXT_TRACE_SQL=token-context-mcp.local -- uvx token-context-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentmcp-name: io.github.MCK564/token-context-mcpFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/token_context_mcp/gui/workers.py:71 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception: # a broken render must not kill the event loopFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/token_context_mcp/constants.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".venv", "venv", "env", ".env", "node_modules", ".pytest_cache",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/token_context_mcp/index/gitinfo.py:18 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/token_context_mcp/gui/bridge.py:61 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.check_output(["nvidia-smi", "--query-gpu=name", "--format=csv,noheader"], text=True, timeout=2)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈67 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for token-context-mcp@0.3.10 as of 28 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mck564: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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