Skills/PyPI/tmw-mcp

tmw-mcp@0.1.4

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A Python client for The Mana World, exposed as an MCP server so an AI agent can play the game." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bjorn · publishing for 188 daysInstalls 72Last detonated 3 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TMW_CREDENTIALS_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: TMW_CLIENT_DATA, TMW_DASHBOARD_PORT, TMW_SERVER, XDG_STATE_HOME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TMW_CREDENTIALS_FILE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tmw-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstmw_mcp/bot.py:149 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import password_for_safety_checkFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtmw_mcp/mcp_server.py:330 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Flush buffered nearby-kill summary once per minuteFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstmw_mcp/bot.py:736 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import load_credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandCLAUDE.md:85 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- **Credentials.** `credentials.json` is `chmod 600` (owner read/write only) and gitignored. Never log it or commit it.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingscripts/extract_packets.py:23 · Dynamic module loadingprotocol = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstmw_mcp/main.py:341 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import load_credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtmw_mcp/mcp_server.py:209 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeslast_beings = {} # block_id -> being data, for kill name lookupsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstmw_mcp/mcp_server.py:400 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import load_credentials, DEFAULT_FILEFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtmw_mcp/bot.py:639 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Auto-pickup nearby items after kill (queue all in radius;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtmw_mcp/mcp_server.py:275 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Snapshot all currently visible beings for kill trackingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtmw_mcp/bot.py:302 · Python subprocess execution detectedos.execv(sys.executable, [sys.executable] + sys.argv)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtmw_mcp/mcp_server.py:208 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeslast_exp = [0] # mutable for closure; tracks EXP for kill notificationsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,446 tok
2 files · 48 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tmw-mcp@0.1.4 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bjorn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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