Skills/PyPI/tm-mcp

tm-mcp@1.4.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "TrafficMorph MCP server — drive load tests and triage regressions from Claude / Cursor / Continue.dev." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher trafficmorph-gif · publishing for 184 daysInstalls 63Last detonated 2 h ago
$claude mcp add tm-mcp -- uvx tm-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TM_API_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TM_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tm-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'trafficmorph'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'anyio'
0.5sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstm_mcp/capture_path.py:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``~/.ssh/``, ``~/.aws/``, ``~/Documents/…`` etc.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 6,939 lines in 14 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tm-mcp@1.4.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.