Skills/PyPI/tistory-mcp

tistory-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Unofficial MCP server for Tistory (티스토리) blogs — write, publish and manage posts from Claude, Cursor, VS Code and other MCP clients" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jangsejong · publishing for 23 daysInstalls 344Last detonated 2 h ago
$claude mcp add tistory-mcp -- uvx tistory-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
tistory.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to tistory.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tistory-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexited 1:
0.6sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.6sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.9sprocessexec .venv/bin/pip
0.9sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/setup.sh: line 26: .venv/bin/pip: No such file or directory

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tistory_mcp/client.py:283 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"""POST /manage/post.json — ALWAYS creates a new post (the server ignores any id).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mcp_call.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=errf)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mcp_probe.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(CMD, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=errf)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/tistory_mcp/server.py:720 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_config.py:28 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetvalidate_cdp_url("http://10.0.0.5:9222")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_config.py:30 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert validate_cdp_url("http://10.0.0.5:9222")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_client.py:111 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert calls == [("PUT", "/manage/post/18.json"), ("DELETE", "/manage/post/18.json")]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tistory_mcp/client.py:303 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"""PUT /manage/post/{id}.json — full body; a missing content would blank the post."""Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈69 tok
1 file · 28 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tistory-mcp@0.2.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

tistory-mcp@0.2.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills