Skills/PyPI/tiktok-mcp-server

tiktok-mcp-server@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for TikTok data extraction, discovery, search, and transcription" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 728 daysInstalls 119Last detonated 6 h ago
$claude mcp add tiktok-mcp-server -- uvx tiktok-mcp-server
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 17 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TRANSCRIBE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: FFMPEG_PATH, TIKTOK_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, TRANSCRIBE_API_URL, TRANSCRIBE_MODEL
Where it talks to
tiktok.com (its own)Also groq.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names groq.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TRANSCRIBE_API_KEY only into requests to tiktok.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets TRANSCRIBE_API_KEY=tiktok.com -- uvx tiktok-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'tiktokmcp'
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'playwright'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'playwright'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.4sprocess8 of 17 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/tiktokmcp/transcribe.py:118 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=self._settings.ffmpeg_timeout_s)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/tiktokmcp/browser.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tiktokmcp/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesNo .env file is read: MCP clients inject configuration through the server'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈58 tok
1 file · 29 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tiktok-mcp-server@1.0.0 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.