ticktick-mcp-v2@1.0.5
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "TickTick MCP Server - Enhanced Version with Chinese Support" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TICKTICK_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: TICKTICK_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso ticktick.com, githubusercontent.com, python.org, postimg.cc — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ticktick.com, githubusercontent.com, python.org, postimg.cc as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TICKTICK_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
os.system(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return ".env.test"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.with open(".env.test", "w") as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.os.system('git push --tags')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system('git tag v{0}'.format(about['__version__']))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Clear authentication info in .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Also save to .env file for compatibilityFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self.env_file = Path(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.config = dotenv_values(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Create a test .env file for manual testing"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.exec(f.read(), about)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.os.system('twine upload dist/*')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for ticktick-mcp-v2@1.0.5 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim example: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.