Skills/PyPI/ticktick-mcp-v2

ticktick-mcp-v2@1.0.5

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "TickTick MCP Server - Enhanced Version with Chinese Support" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher example · publishing for 556 daysInstalls 66Last detonated 6 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TICKTICK_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: TICKTICK_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso ticktick.com, githubusercontent.com, python.org, postimg.cc — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ticktick.com, githubusercontent.com, python.org, postimg.cc as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TICKTICK_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ticktick-mcp-v2

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsrc/submodule/ticktick-py/setup.py:83 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_mcp_parameter_handling.py:554 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn ".env.test"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_mcp_parameter_handling.py:552 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswith open(".env.test", "w") as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsrc/submodule/ticktick-py/setup.py:91 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system('git push --tags')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsrc/submodule/ticktick-py/setup.py:90 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system('git tag v{0}'.format(about['__version__']))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/auth.py:131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Clear authentication info in .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/auth.py:71 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Also save to .env file for compatibilityFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/auth.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesself.env_file = Path(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/submodule/ticktick-py/oauth.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig = dotenv_values(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_mcp_parameter_handling.py:544 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Create a test .env file for manual testing"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codesrc/submodule/ticktick-py/setup.py:53 · Python exec or eval of computed codeexec(f.read(), about)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsrc/submodule/ticktick-py/setup.py:87 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system('twine upload dist/*')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 61 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ticktick-mcp-v2@1.0.5 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim example: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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