Skills/PyPI/ticktick-mcp-server

ticktick-mcp-server@0.3.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Security-hardened MCP server for TickTick task management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher felores · publishing for 670 daysInstalls 110Last detonated 6 h ago
$claude mcp add ticktick-mcp-server -- uvx ticktick-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TICKTICK_AUTH_URLTICKTICK_CLIENT_SECRETTICKTICK_TOKEN_URLConfiguration, not credentials: TICKTICK_BASE_URL, TICKTICK_CLIENT_ID
Where it talks to
ticktick.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TICKTICK_AUTH_URL, TICKTICK_CLIENT_SECRET, TICKTICK_TOKEN_URL and talks to ticktick.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets TICKTICK_AUTH_URL=ticktick.com,TICKTICK_CLIENT_SECRET=ticktick.com,TICKTICK_TOKEN_URL=ticktick.com -- uvx ticktick-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/authenticate.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Check if .env file exists and already has credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/authenticate.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Existing TickTick credentials found in .env file.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/authenticate.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Using existing credentials from .env file.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/src/ticktick_client.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import load_credentials, save_credentials, get_access_token, get_refresh_tokenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/src/auth.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import save_credentials, get_credentials_pathFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/src/server.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import get_access_tokenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/authenticate.py:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("No existing TickTick credentials found in .env file.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsticktick_mcp/authenticate.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path('.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ticktick-mcp-server@0.3.1 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.