Skills/PyPI/thruk-mcp

thruk-mcp@2.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server exposing the Thruk monitoring REST API (Naemon / Nagios / Icinga / Shinken)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher k9fr4n · publishing for 186 daysInstalls 116Last detonated 6 h ago
$claude mcp add thruk-mcp -- uvx thruk-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
THRUK_API_KEY or --header-authConfiguration, not credentials: THRUK_BASE_URL, THRUK_LATENCY_CAP_SECONDS, THRUK_NOISY_MAX_ALERTS
Where it talks to
thruk.org (its own)Also ecritel.net, nagios-plugins.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ecritel.net, nagios-plugins.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects THRUK_API_KEY only into requests to thruk.org (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets THRUK_API_KEY=thruk.org -- uvx thruk-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.yml:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…wiring lives in `__main__.py`). Needs `THRUK_BASE_URL` + `THRUK_API_KEY` (copy `.env.example` → `.env`). ## Architecture **Low-level MCP SDK, not FastMCP — this i…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:76 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- New `THRUK_*` env var must appear in **three** places: `config.py` (`ThrukConfig` field + `from_env()`), `.env.example`, and `catalog/server.yaml` (`config.env` *and* `config.parameters`).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security.py:354 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestraversal_path = "/hosts/../../../etc/passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/test_stdio.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_helpers.py:175 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesencoded = _seg("../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/live_test.py:107 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:13 · Destructive file system command detectedRUN pip install --no-cache-dir /tmp/*.whl && rm -f /tmp/*.whlFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,714 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for thruk-mcp@2.1.0 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.