termux-adbmcp@0.2.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Turn an Android phone (Termux) into an MCP server so AI clients can drive adb devices by natural language" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso jsdelivr.net, githubusercontent.com, statically.io, ghproxy.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
chmod 700 "$H/.termux-mcp" 2>/dev/nullFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null && green "✓ watchdog 已停止 (pid $pid)" || warn "watchdog 未在运行"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.call([bash, str(script)] + args)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$APP_DIR/$f" "$BIN_DIR/adbmcp" 2>/dev/nullFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$H/.termux/boot/boot_mcp.sh" 2>/dev/nullFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# curl -fsSL https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/wu737/adbmcp@main/install/bootstrap.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["pkg", "install", "-y", "android-tools"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(subprocess.run(["adb", "devices"], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.call([str(script)] + args)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# curl -fsSL https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/wu737/adbmcp@main/install/bootstrap.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(["adb", "connect", f"{ip}:{port}"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if [[ -n "$wpid" ]] && kill -0 "$wpid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$oldpid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.out = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(patcher)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--quiet",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for termux-adbmcp@0.2.2 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wu737: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.