Skills/PyPI/temporal-mcp-server

temporal-mcp-server@1.12.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Temporal workflow orchestration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher gethosthewalrus · publishing for 272 daysInstalls 15,430Last detonated 10 h ago
$claude mcp add temporal-mcp-server -- uvx temporal-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TEMPORAL_API_KEYTEMPORAL_CODEC_AUTHTEMPORAL_CODEC_OAUTH_AUDIENCETEMPORAL_CODEC_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDTEMPORAL_CODEC_OAUTH_URLTEMPORAL_CODEC_TOKEN_CACHE or --codec-auth / --codec-token-cache / --codec-oauth-url / --codec-oauth-client-id / --codec-oauth-audienceConfiguration, not credentials: TEMPORAL_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, TEMPORAL_CODEC_ENDPOINT, TEMPORAL_HOST, TEMPORAL_NAMESPACE, TEMPORAL_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_PATH, TEMPORAL_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_PATH, TEMPORAL_TLS_ENABLED
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TEMPORAL_API_KEY, TEMPORAL_CODEC_AUTH, TEMPORAL_CODEC_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, TEMPORAL_CODEC_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, TEMPORAL_CODEC_OAUTH_URL, TEMPORAL_CODEC_TOKEN_CACHE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx temporal-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_codec.py:155 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("endpoint", ["file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://codec.example", "codec.example"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_auth.py:430 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("login_url", ["file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://login.example", "login.example"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_auth.py:449 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkreturn TemporalMCPServer(codec=CodecSettings(endpoint="https://codec.example", token_provider=provider))Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_main.py:320 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_run_main([], {"TEMPORAL_CODEC_ENDPOINT": "file:///etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_main.py:328 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_run_main([], {**self.ENDPOINT, **self.OAUTH_ENV, "TEMPORAL_CODEC_OAUTH_URL": "file:///etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_auth.py:454 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkstatic_auth = await TemporalMCPServer(codec=CodecSettings(endpoint="https://codec.example", auth="Bearer t"))._list_tools(None, None)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for temporal-mcp-server@1.12.0 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.