Skills/PyPI/telnyx-mcp-server-fastmcp

telnyx-mcp-server-fastmcp@0.1.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Telnyx MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fastmcp-me · publishing for 416 daysInstalls 53Last detonated 10 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
NGROK_AUTHTOKENTELNYX_API_KEY or --ngrok-authtokenConfiguration, not credentials: NGROK_URL, TELNYX_API_BASE, TELNYX_MCP_EXCLUDE_TOOLS, TELNYX_MCP_TOOLS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso telnyx.com, ngrok.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names telnyx.com, ngrok.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NGROK_AUTHTOKEN, TELNYX_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx telnyx-mcp-server-fastmcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Zero-width characters (hidden text); Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/telnyx/services/test_assistants.py:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom telnyx_mcp_server.telnyx.services.assistants import AssistantsServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/telnyx_mcp_server/config.py:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:38 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileIf you're using Windows, you will have to enable "Developer Mode" in Claude Desktop to use the MCP server. Click "Help" in the hamburger menu at the top left and select "Enable Developer Mode".Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/telnyx/services/test_embeddings.py:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom telnyx_mcp_server.telnyx.services.embeddings import EmbeddingsServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Zero-width characters (hidden text)README.md:278 · Zero-width characters (hidden text)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.md:38 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction fileIf you're using Windows, you will have to enable "Developer Mode" in Claude Desktop to use the MCP server. Click "Help" in the hamburger menu at the top left and select "Enable Developer Mode".Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/telnyx_mcp_server/config.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/telnyx_mcp_server/server.py:285 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Check for existing sessions and warn (but don't kill them)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/telnyx_mcp_server/webhook/handler.py:359 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# If session limit error, provide guidance but don't kill processesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST05
HIGH
Tunneling service URLsrc/telnyx_mcp_server/webhook/handler.py:396 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure"1. Go to https://dashboard.ngrok.com/agents to manage existing sessions"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/telnyx/services/test_secrets.py:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom telnyx_mcp_server.telnyx.services.secrets import SecretsServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:38 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileIf you're using Windows, you will have to enable "Developer Mode" in Claude Desktop to use the MCP server. Click "Help" in the hamburger menu at the top left and select "Enable Developer Mode".Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/telnyx_mcp_server/server.py:260 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Only clean up our resources using the SDK, don't kill processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Tunneling service URLsrc/telnyx_mcp_server/webhook/handler.py:368 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure"Manual intervention required: check https://dashboard.ngrok.com/agents"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 53 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for telnyx-mcp-server-fastmcp@0.1.3 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fastmcp-me: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Tunneling service URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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