Skills/PyPI/telegram-agent-mcp

telegram-agent-mcp@0.5.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing a Telegram bot so LLM agents can converse, discover each other, and route tasks in a shared group chat" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher clemente-turrubiates · publishing for 137 daysInstalls 194Last detonated 12 h ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TELEGRAM_AGENT_1_TOKENTELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: TELEGRAM_AGENT_DESCRIPTION, TELEGRAM_AGENT_MODEL, TELEGRAM_AGENT_NAME, TELEGRAM_AGENTS_FILE, TELEGRAM_IDLE_SHUTDOWN_SECS, TELEGRAM_MCP_HTTP_ADDR, TELEGRAM_PRIMARY_AGENT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso telegram.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names telegram.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TELEGRAM_AGENT_1_TOKEN, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx telegram-agent-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/CI.yml:90 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filescurl -s $hdr -D h_x.txt -o /dev/null -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp?agent=nope" -d "$init"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/CI.yml:83 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filescurl -s $hdr -D h_a.txt -o /dev/null -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp?agent=alpha" -d "$init"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/CI.yml:84 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filescurl -s $hdr -D h_b.txt -o /dev/null -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp/beta" -d "$init"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/telegram/hub.rs:825 · Destructive file system command detected/// Renders a loose set of messages in the same `#seq` thread formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.github/workflows/CI.yml:74 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processestrap 'kill $HUB 2>/dev/null || true' EXITFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.github/workflows/CI.yml:111 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processestrap 'kill $HUB 2>/dev/null || true' EXITFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/config.rs:556 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringOne agent (one MCP client, one bot): paste the token into TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈822 tok
2 files · 23 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for telegram-agent-mcp@0.5.0 as of 12 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim clemente-turrubiates: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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