telecom-mcp@0.1.9
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for telecom observability" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 47 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TELECOM_MCP_AUTH_TOKENTELECOM_MCP_CALLER_TOKENTELECOM_MCP_CONFIRM_TOKENTELECOM_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTHENTICATED_CALLERTELECOM_MCP_REQUIRE_CONFIRM_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CHAOS_MODE, TELECOM_MCP_ALLOWED_CALLERS, TELECOM_MCP_ALLOWED_CAPABILITY_CLASSES, TELECOM_MCP_CALLER_ID, TELECOM_MCP_CRITICAL_MODULES, TELECOM_MCP_DISABLE_LOCAL_ASTERISK_LOGS, TELECOM_MCP_ENABLE_ACTIVE_PROBES, TELECOM_MCP_ENABLE_CHAOS, TELECOM_MCP_ENABLE_HIGH_RISK_CAPABILITY_CLASSES, TELECOM_MCP_ENABLE_SELF_HEALING, TELECOM_MCP_ENFORCE_TARGET_POLICY, TELECOM_MCP_EXPORT_MAX_EVIDENCE_ITEMS, TELECOM_MCP_FAIL_ON_DEGRADED_DEFAULT, TELECOM_MCP_LEGACY_LINE_PROTOCOL, TELECOM_MCP_PROBE_MAX_PER_MINUTE, TELECOM_MCP_PROBE_MAX_TIMEOUT_S, TELECOM_MCP_RISKY_MODULE_PATTERNS, TELECOM_MCP_RUNTIME_PROFILE, TELECOM_MCP_STATE_DIR, TELECOM_MCP_STRICT_STATE_PERSISTENCE, TELECOM_MCP_TARGETS_FILE, TELECOM_MCP_TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TELECOM_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, TELECOM_MCP_CALLER_TOKEN, TELECOM_MCP_CONFIRM_TOKEN, TELECOM_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTHENTICATED_CALLER, TELECOM_MCP_REQUIRE_CONFIRM_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 94/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
url: http://10.0.0.10:8088Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.url: http://10.0.0.10:8088Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.url: http://10.0.0.10:8088Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.url: http://10.0.0.10:8088Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.url: http://10.0.0.10:8088Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for telecom-mcp@0.1.9 as of 12 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.