Skills/PyPI/teamwork-mcp

teamwork-mcp@0.3.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "SSE-based MCP Server and Client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher qingxu-fu-fuqingxu.fqx · publishing for 540 daysInstalls 79Last detonated 12 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 21 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DASHSCOPE_API_KEYGITHUB_TOKENTOKENIZERS_PARALLELISMConfiguration, not credentials: BROWSER_PROXY_SERVER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso arxiv.org, nih.gov, weather.com, searx.be, priv.au, scmor.com, aliyuncs.com, firecrawl.dev, people.com.cn — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names arxiv.org, nih.gov, weather.com, searx.be, priv.au, scmor.com, aliyuncs.com, firecrawl.dev, people.com.cn as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DASHSCOPE_API_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, TOKENIZERS_PARALLELISM only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx teamwork-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'loguru'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'tiktoken'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'fastapi'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'teamwork_mcp'
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.6sprocess8 of 21 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandteamwork_mcp/rfft_tools/real_chrome_browser.py:72 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesprint(f"Failed to kill chrome: {e}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedteamwork_mcp/rfft_tools/real_chrome_browser.py:157 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system('bash -c "source /home/headless/.bashrc && killer chrome"')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandteamwork_mcp/rfft_tools/real_chrome_browser.py:159 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesprint(f"Failed to kill chrome: {e}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandteamwork_mcp/async_utils.py:34 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesprocess.kill() # kill it with the hard way, process.terminate may timeout.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedteamwork_mcp/rfft_tools/real_chrome_browser.py:70 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system('bash -c "source /home/headless/.bashrc && killer chrome"')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 48 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for teamwork-mcp@0.3.3 as of 12 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim qingxu-fu-fuqingxu.fqx: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim qingxu-fu-fuqingxu.fqxPropose a patch to the maintainer