Skills/PyPI/tdengine-mcp-server

tdengine-mcp-server@0.0.9

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Add your description here" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher lcprunstone · publishing for 576 daysInstalls 72Last detonated 14 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TDENGINE_PASSWORD or --taos-passwordConfiguration, not credentials: TDENGINE_DATABASE, TDENGINE_HOST, TDENGINE_PORT, TDENGINE_TIMEOUT, TDENGINE_USERNAME, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso taosdata.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/python-publish.yml:28 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:41 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/python-publish.yml:28 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/tdengine_mcp_server/server.py:121 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads# https://docs.taosdata.com/2.6/reference/rest-api/#http-%E8%BF%94%E5%9B%9E%E6%A0%BC%E5%BC%8FFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.md:185 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file4. Enable debug mode by setting `LOG_LEVEL` in your configurationFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈46 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tdengine-mcp-server@0.0.9 as of 14 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lcprunstone: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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