Skills/PyPI/tares

tares@1.59.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Open-source platform for always-on AI agents: a software factory for Claude Code that takes your projects from tickets to merged pull requests, or an AI SRE that watches your systems." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher glassflow · publishing for 190 daysInstalls 6,121Last detonated 22 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ROOT_TOKENTARES_AUTH_TOKENTARES_METRICS_TOKENTARES_STATE_DSNConfiguration, not credentials: ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, CLAUDE_BIN, CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT, FACTORY_CREW_HOME, TARES_AGENT_MODEL, TARES_ANTHROPIC_BASE, TARES_CATALOG, TARES_CATALOG_SYNC, TARES_CLOUD_URL, TARES_DB, TARES_DEGRADED_PCT, TARES_DUCKDB_MEMORY_LIMIT, TARES_DUCKDB_THREADS, TARES_EDITION, TARES_ENTITY_CARDINALITY_CAP, TARES_FACTORY_URL, TARES_GITHUB_CONNECT_URL, TARES_HOME, TARES_HOST, TARES_INGEST_PAUSE_PCT, TARES_INSTANCE_NAME, TARES_KEYRING, TARES_LINEAR_CONNECT_URL, TARES_LOGIN_URL, TARES_LOGOUT_URL, TARES_MAX_DB_SIZE, TARES_MCP_HOST, TARES_MCP_PORT, TARES_MCP_TRANSPORT, TARES_OTLP_GRPC_PORT, TARES_PLUGIN_DIR, TARES_PORT, TARES_PUBLIC_URL, TARES_REQUIRE_CONSOLE, TARES_SEED_PROJECT, TARES_SEED_USECASE
Where it talks to
tares-glassflow.com (its own)Also glassflow.ai, astral.sh, navflow.dev, githubcopilot.com, llm-gateway.internal, linear.app, slack.com, rius-glassflow.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names glassflow.ai, astral.sh, navflow.dev, githubcopilot.com, llm-gateway.internal, linear.app, slack.com, rius-glassflow.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ROOT_TOKEN, TARES_AUTH_TOKEN, TARES_METRICS_TOKEN, TARES_STATE_DSN only into requests to tares-glassflow.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ROOT_TOKEN=tares-glassflow.com,TARES_AUTH_TOKEN=tares-glassflow.com,TARES_METRICS_TOKEN=tares-glassflow.com,TARES_STATE_DSN=tares-glassflow.com -- uvx tares

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.57.0

vet-skills diff tares 1.57.0 1.59.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.57.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

1.57.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterntares/words.py:10 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -s $A/api/home | python -m tares.words --skip name,goal,title,detail,said,textFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/windows_spike.py:362 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", ps_cmd],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/windows_spike.py:288 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.p = subprocess.Popen(argv, **kw)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/ci_e2e.py:105 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(["node", os.path.join("tests", f"{suite}.e2e.cjs")], cwd=ui, env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/windows_spike.py:1715 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes- Its own quiet check (what `inFlight` and `updatedAt` give today), its own stop (kill the process tree), and its own wake-ups for stations that sleep between turns.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/windows_spike.py:563 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run([self.claude, "agents", "--json"] + (["--all"] if "--all" in rec["argv"] else []),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtares/skills.py:67 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contenttext = (text or "").lstrip("").replace("\r\n", "\n")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/windows_spike.py:263 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["taskkill", "/T", "/F", "/PID", str(pid)], capture_output=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filestares/daemon.py:5195 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file"""{text}: add one line to the global AGENTS.md (`agents`) or memory (`memory`). A lineFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtares/crew/up.py:507 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([claude], cwd=home, env=self.env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/check-shared-mcp.sh:54 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsprintf '#!/bin/sh\ntouch "%s/tares-mcp-started"\nexit 1\n' "$T" > "$T/bin/tares-mcp"; chmod +x "$T/bin/tares-mcp"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filestares/daemon.py:5168 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file"""{text}: add one line to the caller's personal AGENTS.md (`agents`) or memoryFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtares/crew/kit.py:158 · Python subprocess execution detectedif subprocess.run(["git", "-C", root, "rev-parse", "--git-dir"], capture_output=True, timeout=30).returncode != 0:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e-github-tickets.sh:33 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesstop_daemon() { [ -n "$DPID" ] && { kill "$DPID" 2>/dev/null || true; wait "$DPID" 2>/dev/null || true; DPID=""; }; return 0; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tares/config.py:364 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkraise CatalogError(f"mcp_server {m['name']!r}: url must be an http(s) URL "Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e-github-tickets.sh:39 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesecho "console: $DAEMON/projects/${UID_P:-} (stop it with: kill $DPID)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/crew_smoke.py:243 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtares/runtime.py:147 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as e: # never let one source kill the loopFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/ci_run.py:70 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.call([sys.executable, os.path.join(base, f"{t}.py")])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/crew_smoke.py:316 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(cmd, env=self.env, stdout=log, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageAGENTS.md:26 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeBrowser suites locally: `cd ui && npm ci && npm run build && npx playwright install chromium`, then from the repo rootFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/windows_spike.py:374 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(["ps", "-axo", "pid=,ppid=,command="], capture_output=True, timeout=30).stdout.decode("utf-8", "replace")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Collects environment variables by secret-like namestests/_env.py:31 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesenv = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if not _leaks(k)}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/check-shared-mcp.sh:19 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processescleanup() { local p; for p in $PIDS; do kill "$p" 2>/dev/null || true; wait "$p" 2>/dev/null || true; done; rm -rf "$T"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtares/crew/kit.py:160 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(["git", "--no-optional-locks", "-C", root, "status", "--porcelain",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageAGENTS.md:44 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecd ui && npm ci && npx tsc --noEmit && npm run build # produces ui/distFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/windows_spike.py:1587 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif alive(): # it ignored the marker: kill it only when its command line is oursFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,193 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim glassflow: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim glassflowPropose a patch to the maintainer