talkops-tempo-mcp-server@0.2.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Grafana Tempo distributed tracing and observability." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TEMPO_AUTH_HEADERConfiguration, not credentials: DEVOPS_PLUGINS_ROOT, K8S_CONTEXT, K8S_ENABLED, K8S_IN_CLUSTER, K8S_KUBECONFIG, KUBECONFIG, MCP_ALLOW_WRITE, MCP_DEBUG, MCP_FIELD_MANAGER, MCP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, MCP_HTTP_KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT, MCP_HTTP_TIMEOUT, MCP_LOG_FORMAT, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_READ_ONLY, MCP_RESPONSE_SIZE_HARD_LIMIT, MCP_RESPONSE_SIZE_SOFT_LIMIT, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_VERSION, MCP_TOOLSETS, MCP_TRANSPORT, PROMETHEUS_BASE_URL, PROMETHEUS_URL, TEMPO_BACKEND_ID, TEMPO_BACKENDS, TEMPO_BASE_URL, TEMPO_CRD_API_VERSION, TEMPO_CRD_GROUP, TEMPO_DEFAULT_METRICS_SAMPLING, TEMPO_DEFAULT_SEARCH_LIMIT, TEMPO_DEFAULT_SPSS, TEMPO_DEFAULT_TENANT, TEMPO_DEPLOYMENT_MODE, TEMPO_DISPLAY_NAME, TEMPO_LLM_FORMAT, TEMPO_MAX_LOOKBACK- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso cluster.local, amazonaws.com, gofastmcp.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cluster.local, amazonaws.com, gofastmcp.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TEMPO_AUTH_HEADER only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.2.0
vet-skills diff talkops-tempo-mcp-server 0.2.0 0.2.1In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.2.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
0.2.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
from tempo_mcp_server.services.kubernetes_service import KubernetesServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.run_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.from tempo_mcp_server.services.kubernetes_service import KubernetesServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.help_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.def mcp_server(mock_tempo_http):Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.from tempo_mcp_server.services.kubernetes_service import KubernetesServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.chown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.from tempo_mcp_server.services.kubernetes_service import KubernetesServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Strip inline comments and surrounding whitespace from a .env value."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from tempo_mcp_server.services.kubernetes_service import KubernetesServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.from tempo_mcp_server.services.kubernetes_service import KubernetesServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for talkops-tempo-mcp-server@0.2.1 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.