talkops-argocd-mcp-server@0.4.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) execution server for managing Kubernetes applications and resources via ArgoCD using GitOps principles." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ARGOCD_AUTH_TOKENGIT_PASSWORDSSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: ARGOCD_INSECURE, ARGOCD_MAX_RETRIES, ARGOCD_SERVER_URL, ARGOCD_TIMEOUT, GIT_USERNAME, MCP_ALLOW_WRITE, MCP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, MCP_HTTP_KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT, MCP_HTTP_TIMEOUT, MCP_LOG_FORMAT, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_VERSION, MCP_TOOLSETS, MCP_TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso default.svc, argocd.svc, gofastmcp.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names default.svc, argocd.svc, gofastmcp.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ARGOCD_AUTH_TOKEN, GIT_PASSWORD, SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.4.0
vet-skills diff talkops-argocd-mcp-server 0.4.0 0.4.1In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.4.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
0.4.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: Path to SSH private key file (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- **`ssh://...` or `git@...` URLs**: Reads the SSH private key from `SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` (default `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) on the MCP server host.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.--env-file .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: Path to SSH private key file (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ssh_private_key_path: str = '~/.ssh/id_rsa'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary><strong>All 8 resources</strong></summary> | Resource | What it returns | | :--- | :--- | | `argocd://applications` | Catalog of all ArgoCD applicationFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.ssh_private_key_path=os.getenv('SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH', '~/.ssh/id_rsa'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ssh_private_key_path=os.getenv('SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH', '~/.ssh/id_rsa'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- **`ssh://...` or `git@...` URLs**: Reads the SSH private key from `SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` (default `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) on the MCP server host.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ssh_private_key_path: str = '~/.ssh/id_rsa'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill -0 1 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- ${HOME}/.ssh/id_rsa:/app/.ssh/id_rsa:roFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for talkops-argocd-mcp-server@0.4.1 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim talkops-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.