Skills/PyPI/talkops-argocd-mcp-server

talkops-argocd-mcp-server@0.4.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) execution server for managing Kubernetes applications and resources via ArgoCD using GitOps principles." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher talkops-ai · publishing for 185 daysInstalls 282Last detonated 16 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ARGOCD_AUTH_TOKENGIT_PASSWORDSSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: ARGOCD_INSECURE, ARGOCD_MAX_RETRIES, ARGOCD_SERVER_URL, ARGOCD_TIMEOUT, GIT_USERNAME, MCP_ALLOW_WRITE, MCP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, MCP_HTTP_KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT, MCP_HTTP_TIMEOUT, MCP_LOG_FORMAT, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_VERSION, MCP_TOOLSETS, MCP_TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso default.svc, argocd.svc, gofastmcp.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names default.svc, argocd.svc, gofastmcp.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ARGOCD_AUTH_TOKEN, GIT_PASSWORD, SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx talkops-argocd-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.4.0

vet-skills diff talkops-argocd-mcp-server 0.4.0 0.4.1

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.4.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.4.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryargocd_mcp_server/config.py:31 · References a credential file in the home directorySSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: Path to SSH private key file (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryskills/onboarding-argocd-repositories-and-projects/SKILL.md:26 · References a credential file in the home directory- **`ssh://...` or `git@...` URLs**: Reads the SSH private key from `SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` (default `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) on the MCP server host.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/onboarding-argocd-repositories-and-projects/SKILL.md:117 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--env-file .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsargocd_mcp_server/config.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: Path to SSH private key file (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryargocd_mcp_server/config.py:35 · References a credential file in the home directoryssh_private_key_path: str = '~/.ssh/id_rsa'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:208 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><strong>All 8 resources</strong></summary> | Resource | What it returns | | :--- | :--- | | `argocd://applications` | Catalog of all ArgoCD applicationFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsargocd_mcp_server/config.py:117 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesssh_private_key_path=os.getenv('SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH', '~/.ssh/id_rsa'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryargocd_mcp_server/config.py:117 · References a credential file in the home directoryssh_private_key_path=os.getenv('SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH', '~/.ssh/id_rsa'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/onboarding-argocd-repositories-and-projects/SKILL.md:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **`ssh://...` or `git@...` URLs**: Reads the SSH private key from `SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` (default `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) on the MCP server host.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsargocd_mcp_server/config.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesssh_private_key_path: str = '~/.ssh/id_rsa'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:43 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/skills/test_manifest_script.py:119 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddocker-healthcheck.sh:6 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -0 1 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:22 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/skills/test_manifest_script.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:48 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/skills/test_manifest_script.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/skills/test_manifest_script.py:92 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorydocker-compose.yml:44 · References a credential file in the home directory- ${HOME}/.ssh/id_rsa:/app/.ssh/id_rsa:roFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,751 tok
4 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for talkops-argocd-mcp-server@0.4.1 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim talkops-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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