Skills/PyPI/taiwan-laboratory-mcp

taiwan-laboratory-mcp@0.1.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing Taiwan laboratory medicine public data as AI-agent tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher masalu0105-gif · publishing for 59 daysInstalls 68Last detonated 16 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TAIWAN_LAB_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN_SHA256Configuration, not credentials: CONFIG_PATH, DATA_DIR, MCP_EXE, TAIWAN_LAB_DATA_DIR, TAIWAN_LAB_DATA_MODE, TAIWAN_LAB_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, TAIWAN_LAB_HTTP_HOST, TAIWAN_LAB_HTTP_PATH, TAIWAN_LAB_HTTP_PORT, TAIWAN_LAB_HTTP_USAGE_LOG
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso cdc.gov.tw, data.gov.tw, astral.sh, nhi.gov.tw, fda.gov.tw — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cdc.gov.tw, data.gov.tw, astral.sh, nhi.gov.tw, fda.gov.tw as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TAIWAN_LAB_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN_SHA256 only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx taiwan-laboratory-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install-taiwan-lab-mcp.sh:88 · Remote installer piped to shell|| stop_with_advice '自動安裝 uv 失敗' '開一個新的終端機視窗,貼上 curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh,裝完再跑一次這支腳本。'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:22 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chown "$(id -u):$(id -g)" "$backup"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:15 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "$recovery_dir"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsrc/taiwan_lab_mcp/data_cli.py:502 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimefrom .tfda_autoupdate import plan_tfda_retentionFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ops/deploy-grok-production-0.1.2.sh:24 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "${base}/grok-production-supervise-app.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo install -o root -g root -m 755 "$patch_file" "$vendor_launcher"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install-taiwan-lab-mcp.sh:88 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code|| stop_with_advice '自動安裝 uv 失敗' '開一個新的終端機視窗,貼上 curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh,裝完再跑一次這支腳本。'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install-taiwan-lab-mcp.sh:87 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh >/dev/null 2>&1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install-taiwan-lab-mcp.sh:87 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh >/dev/null 2>&1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:44 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo grep -Fq "$end_marker" "$vendor_launcher"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:21 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo cp "$vendor_launcher" "$backup"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:22 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chown "$(id -u):$(id -g)" "$backup"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:18 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif ! sudo grep -Fq "$begin_marker" "$vendor_launcher"; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ops/deploy-grok-production-0.1.2.sh:11 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "$supervisor_next"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ops/install-grok-vm-boot-hook.sh:23 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$backup"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for taiwan-laboratory-mcp@0.1.3 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim masalu0105-gif: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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