Skills/PyPI/taiwan-fda-mcp

taiwan-fda-mcp@0.9.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing Taiwan FDA (TFDA) drug-license and package-insert data to LLM clients. Independent open-source wrapper; not a TFDA product." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher shin13 · publishing for 172 daysInstalls 151Last detonated 16 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 24 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso fda.gov.tw, nhi.gov.tw — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx taiwan-fda-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'platformdirs'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pythonjsonlogger'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'fastmcp'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.4sprocess8 of 24 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/taiwan_fda_mcp/config.py:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# brief: Application settings loaded from .env via pydantic-settings.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/taiwan_fda_mcp/config.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Application settings — populated from .env / environment variables."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/taiwan_fda_mcp/config.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:15 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chown -R appuser:appuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/taiwan_fda_mcp/sources/nhi/dataset.py:125 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentreader = csv.DictReader(io.StringIO(text.lstrip("")))Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: .env # operators tune throttle / TTL / volume hereFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_config.py:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Assert the field default directly so a local .env cannot affect the result.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contenttests/unit/test_tools.py:208 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads"%E8%A1%9B%E7%BD%B2%E8%97%A5%E8%BC%B8%E5%AD%97%E7%AC%AC021571%E8%99%9F"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_nhi_dataset.py:104 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentrows_with_bom = parse_rows("" + _FIXTURE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:21 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p /cache && chown appuser:appuser /cacheFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_config.py:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Assert the field default directly so a local .env cannot affect the result.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈73 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for taiwan-fda-mcp@0.9.0 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim shin13: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim shin13Propose a patch to the maintainer