tabpilot-mcp@0.1.2
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server that reads and drives a real, logged-in Chrome — cross-platform, Ubuntu-headless first-class." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.call(command)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Or install the distro build: sudo apt install -y chromium-browser",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."sudo apt install -y fonts-liberation fonts-noto-core fonts-noto-cjk",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f"log out. Run: sudo loginctl enable-linger {user}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."sudo apt install -y fontconfig fonts-liberation fonts-noto-core fonts-noto-cjk",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." sudo apt install -y ./google-chrome-stable_current_amd64.deb\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." sudo apt install -y fonts-noto-core fonts-noto-cjk",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chown -R tabpilot:tabpilot /home/tabpilot /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."sudo apt install -y ./google-chrome-stable_current_amd64.deb"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for tabpilot-mcp@0.1.2 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hunglp97: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.