Skills/PyPI/tableau-hosted-mcp

tableau-hosted-mcp@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Python SDK for Tableau Hosted MCP" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mohamed-setit · publishing for 138 daysInstalls 59Last detonated 16 h ago
$claude mcp add tableau-hosted-mcp -- uvx tableau-hosted-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OPENAI_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso tableau.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names tableau.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tableau-hosted-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/playground.py:605 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesst.info("No `.env` file in current working directory.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/playground.py:210 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesst.json(tool["input_schema"])Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/playground.py:600 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path.cwd() / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/settings.py:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/cli/playground.py:58 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, check=True, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/settings.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPrecedence (highest wins): constructor kwargs > env vars > .env file > defaults.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/playground.py:579 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Precedence: constructor kwargs > env vars > `.env` file > defaults. "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tableau_hosted_mcp/playground.py:599 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesst.markdown("### `.env` file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tableau-hosted-mcp@0.1.1 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

tableau-hosted-mcp@0.1.1 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills