tab-shell-mcp@0.1.2
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for shell command execution" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
'bash -c "rm -rf /"', blacklist=["rm"], whitelist=[]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'bash -c "rm -rf /"', blacklist=["rm"], whitelist=[]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = extract_command_names("env FOO=1 rm -rf /tmp/x")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."echo hello && rm -rf /", blacklist=["rm"], whitelist=[]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.allowed, reason = validate_command("rm -rf /", blacklist=["rm"], whitelist=[])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result_json = await server.execute_shell_command(command="rm -rf /tmp/foo")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = extract_command_names('bash -c "rm -rf /tmp"')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."echo hello && rm -rf /", blacklist=["rm"], whitelist=[]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.allowed, reason = validate_command("rm -rf /", blacklist=["rm"], whitelist=[])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = json.loads(await server.execute_shell_command(command="cat /etc/passwd"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for tab-shell-mcp@0.1.2 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.