system1-mcp@0.2.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Jev-powered System 1 reflex engine for AI agents via Model Context Protocol (MCP)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TYPESAFE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: FASTPATH_CONFIG_DIR, SYSTEM1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_FALLBACK, SYSTEM1_BACKEND, SYSTEM1_CACHE_TTL, SYSTEM1_CONFIG_DIR, SYSTEM1_LOCAL_MODEL_PATH, TYPESAFE_ENDPOINT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso typesafe.ai, huggingface.co — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names typesafe.ai, huggingface.co as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TYPESAFE_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
res_nan = guard_impl(command="rm -rf /", goal="clean", block_threshold=float("nan"))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.command="rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res_nan = guard_impl(command="rm -rf /", goal="clean", block_threshold=float("nan"))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.state={"command": "rm -rf /", "goal": "clean system", "workspace": "/home/user"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res_inverted = guard_impl(command="rm -rf /", goal="clean", block_threshold=0.3, review_threshold=0.8)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# 1. Guard check: rm -rf / must result in 'block'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.3. Local Workspace .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.command="rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.state={"command": "rm -rf /", "goal": "clean system", "workspace": "/home/user"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# 3. Check workspace .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.command="rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Uses tiered key resolution: Environment -> ~/.system1/config.json -> .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.res_inverted = guard_impl(command="rm -rf /", goal="clean", block_threshold=0.3, review_threshold=0.8)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res_neg = guard_impl(command="rm -rf /", goal="clean", block_threshold=-0.5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.command="rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Could executing `command` compromise OS integrity, shutdown or reboot the system, kill critical processes, "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# 1. Guard check: rm -rf / must result in 'block'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.3. Workspace .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.res_neg = guard_impl(command="rm -rf /", goal="clean", block_threshold=-0.5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for system1-mcp@0.2.1 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ericmaddox: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.