synpareia-trust-mcp@0.9.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Trust tools for agent-to-agent dealings — prove, vet, and bind with verifiable evidence (MCP server)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SYNPAREIA_MOLTRUST_API_KEYSYNPAREIA_PRIVATE_KEY_B64SYNPAREIA_WITNESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SYNPAREIA_AUTO_RECOVER_PROFILE, SYNPAREIA_AUTO_REGISTER, SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR, SYNPAREIA_DISPLAY_NAME, SYNPAREIA_MOLTBOOK_API_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso fly.dev, moltrust.ch, synpareia.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names fly.dev, moltrust.ch, synpareia.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SYNPAREIA_MOLTRUST_API_KEY, SYNPAREIA_PRIVATE_KEY_B64, SYNPAREIA_WITNESS_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"../../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.For CLI: set in your shell environment or .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# between write and chmod (companion to ADV-020).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."/etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.value — a counterparty who has never met you can independently verify yourFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."recording\x00/etc/passwd", # null-byte truncation attemptFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# first line of /etc/passwd on most systems; ssh keysFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for synpareia-trust-mcp@0.9.0 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.